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HENRY WHEATON ON 'AMERICAN LAW'
IN "THE JURIST" (LONDON)
KURT H. NADELMANN

I.

HISTORY OF "THE JURIST"

THE beginnings of interest abroad and, in particular, in England,
in the development of ihe law in the United States is a neglected, but
fascinating, topic. The American Constitution had attracted worldwide attention from the very first. The status of the law in the
United States became a subject of interest only gradually. When did
this interest start? What information became available, and through
which channels? Did knowledge about the evolution of the law in the
United States affect law development elsewhere? Studies of these
questions are lacking. If we were to judge from the thirteenth (posthumous) volume of Holdsworth's History of English Law, American
influence, direct or indirect, on law reform in England during the
critical years of the early 19th century is non-existent or, at least, not
worth mentioning. This may, or may not, be so.
Even before American law became accessible generally through
the four volumes of Kent's Commentaries on American Law appearing
between 1826 and 1830 and the series of Commentaries on specific
subjects from the pen of Joseph Story, which began to appear in 1832,
American legal institutions had attracted the attention of some of the
principal English law reformers. What they knew of developments in
the United States reached the legal profession at large through the
first modern law journal produced in England, "The Jurist, or Quarterly Journal of Jurisprudence and Legislation," launched in 1827.
"It has Law Reform and Improvement for its object, and pursues
that object with the best intentions, and distinguished talent," was
Bentham's characterization of "The Jurist" in a letter to Edward Livingston written in February 1830.1
The story of "The Jurist" has, we think, never been written.
According to one account,2 the idea of publishing "The Jurist" arose
with Mr. Bickersteth (Lord Langdale) and Joseph Parkes. Parkes
undertook to draw up the prospectus, and Mr. Bickersteth contributKuRT H. NAnaImarN is a Lecturer in Comparative Law at New York University
Law School.
1 11 VoRxs oF JERE=rY BENTH~mt 35 (Bowning ed. 1843).
2 1 HARDY,M

iROs or THE RT.HON. HENRY LoRD LANGDALE 370 (1852).
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ed 500 pounds. Henry Roscoe became technical editor. 3 Like all
avant-garde publications, "The Jurist" had difficult sailing. Six issues

were brought out, relatively regularly, until the beginning of 1829.
No further issues appeared before an April 1832 issue, and "The

Jurist" passed away after publication of its tenth, February 1833,
issue. In 1828, Hayward's "Law Magazine; Quarterly Review of
Jurisprudence" had been started-which must have added to the

difficulties. As for quality, "The Jurist" may be called one of the best
law journals ever published. 4
The first issue of "The Jurist," dated March 1827, carried as
second item an article of twenty pages, entitled, "Progress of Jurisprudence in the United States." 5 The anonymous author-presumably Joseph Parkes--described legal developments in the United
States on the basis of information drawn from five works listed in
7
front of the article.
The third issue, January 1828, brought as sixth item an article,
entitled, "American Law."18 It was an original contribution, from the
distinguished American lawyer, Henry Wheaton. The article was in
form of answers to forty questions addressed to Wheaton by a member of the English Bar, Jabez Henry. Both questions and answers are
reproduced, the entire paper running over fifteen pages. The ques3 According to 9 THnEzs, ou BIBLIOTHiQUE DU JURISCONSULTE 288 (1827), Sutton
Sharpe was the principal editor. On Sharpe, see DoRis GUNNELL, SUTTON SHARPE ET SES
Azns FRAlAiS (Paris, 1925). Collaborators, according to Themis: John Stuart Mill,
Bickersteth (Lord Langdale), Joseph Parkes, Fonblanque, Goff. 8 Id. 278, 9 Id. 288,
566, 10 Id. 573.
4 In this country, it had a distinguished "successor" in the "American Jurist and
Law Magazine," launched in 1829, with Willard Phillips as the first editor.
5 1 JURIST 22 (1827).
6 On Parkes, see 13 HOLDSWORTaH, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAw 292 (1952); HOLDSWORTH, THE MOVMENT FOR REFORvS IN THE LAW (1793-1832) 208, 226 (1940). Parkes
was married to a daughter of Dr. Priestley (who died in the United States). See BENTHAm, PRINciPLES OF LEGISLATION 75 (Neal ed. Boston 1830). Parkes's principal writings:
A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1828), reviewed in 1 JuRisT 446 (1828), and
EQUITY JURISDICTIONs AND LAW OF REAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES,

NORTH

AmERICA (1830). The latter volume is not mentioned in Holdsworth.
7 Charles Jared Ingersoll, "Oration" before the American Philosophical Society
in 1823; Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, "Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the
jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States"; the anonymously published "The
English Practice: A Statement showing some of the Evils and Absurdities of the
Practice of the English Common Law, as adopted in several of the United States, and
particularly in the State of New York," attributed to Henry Dwight Sedgwick; William
Rawle, "View of the Constitution of the United States of America"; and Salma Hale,
"History of the United States, from their first Settlement as Colonies, to the Close
of the War with Great Britain, in 1815."
8 1 JURIST 430 (1828).

1958]

HENRY WHEATON ON "AMERICAN LAW"

tions covered a wide field, and the field was further broadened by
some of the answers. The great majority of the questions were on
topics of the conflict of laws, with the first question on the effect
given to foreign discharges in bankruptcy. Under the signature of
the leading specialist among the American practitioners, we find here
an early restatement, in masterly form, of American rules of conflict
of laws. But the answers on other questions are of no lesser interest.
Wheaton's contribution to the English journal has remained unnoticed in the United States. William Beach Lawrence's authoritative
biography of Wheaton 9 does not mention the article, but Lawrence was
obviously unaware of its existence. The same holds true for more recent biographers."0 The small number of sets of "The Jurist" available
in this country must of course be considered. For historical reasons,
for its quality, and because of the distinguished position of the author in American law, the Wheaton statement on American law is entitled to reproduction in an American legal journal for preservation.
II.

BACKGROUND

OF THE ARTICLE

Wheaton had, in the Spring of 1827, completed his twelfth year
as official reporter of the Supreme Court of the United States. During the 1827 term, he had appeared before the Supreme Court in
seven cases. One was the mammoth case Ogden v. Saunders," which
had been argued a first time in 1824, on the extraterritorial effect
of a discharge from debt granted under a state insolvency law. In
March, Wheaton- had resigned from the position he had held since
1825 as one of the Commissioners appointed to revise the Statute
Laws of the State of New York. President John Quincy Adams appointed his Charg6 d'Affaires to Denmark shortly thereafter. On the
way to Copenhagen, Wheaton stayed over in London from the end of
July to the beginning of September. He was very well received by
the English Bar. Bentham invited him and he met the latter's disciples and admirers. Among the latter was Jabez Henry.
Jabez Henry is the "Henry on Foreign Law" known to the conflicts specialists from the many references to that work in Story's
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-rather than from the work
itself, of which few copies are in American libraries. Henry had a
9 LAWRENCE, NOTICE OF THE AUTHOR

[WHEATON]

BY THE EDITOR, in

ELFMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW X
(6th ed., by Lawrence, Boston, 1855).
10 Among them, ELIZABETH F. BAKER, HENRY WHEATON, 1785-1848 (1937).

11 12 Wheat. 213 (U.S. 1827).
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distinguished, unusual career. Called to the Middle Temple in 1809,
he had served as president of the Courts of Criminal and Civil Justice of Demerara and Essequibo from 1813 to 1816. Deeply concerned about the conditions of the slaves in these colonies ceded by
the Dutch, he had, after his return, brought out a little volume with
citations on "Points in Manumission and Cases of Contested Freedom."" In 1821, he published the report submitted by him to the
Secretary of the Colonies on the Criminal Law at Demerara and the
Ceded Dutch Colonies. 3 He had, in the meantime, served a short
while as Chief Judge in Corfu, in the Protectorate of the "United
States of the Ionian Islands." But his main interest had become the
problems of the conflict of laws.
As president of the court of Demerara, Henry was called upon
to decide whether, under the applicable Roman-Dutch law, a discharge in bankruptcy granted a debtor in England protected him in
Demerara from a suit by local creditors who had not participated in
the proceedings in England. The case, Odwin v. Forbes,14 was decided in 1814. In 1817, the Privy Council confirmed the judgment.'
In 1823, Henry published in London a volume of some 300 pages'0
with his opinion in Odwin v. Forbes as the central piece. The Dutch
and English conflicts doctrines and decisions are discussed exhaustively in the opinion. Prefixed to the opinion is a text of about 100
pages, entitled, "Treatise on the Difference between Personal and
Real Statutes, and its Effect on Foreign Judgments and Contracts,
Marriages and Wills." Added is an appendix with collateral materials
of another 100 pages. Opening with Huber's famous three maxims,
the treatise discusses conflict of laws closely following the treatment
given the subject by the French jurist Boullenois in his "Trait6 de ]a
Personalit6 et de RalitM6 des Loix, Coutumes et Statuts, par forme
12 HENRY, POINTS IN MANUM1ISSION, AND CASES OF CONTESTED FREEDOM (1817).
13 HENRY, REPORT ON THE CRamNAL LAW AT DEMERARA, AND IN THE CEDED DUTCH
COLOmIES, WITH AN APPENDIX ON THE NATURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE FISCAL (1821).
14 A report of the case, with a summary of the Henry opinion, appeared in
1 BUCK, CASES IN BANKRUPTCY 57, published in London in 1820.
15 1 BucK, CASES IN BANxRU)?TCy 64.
16 HENRY, 'HE JUDG6NT oF TnE COURT OF DEMERARA IN THE CASE OF ODWIN V.
FORBES, ON THE PLEA OF THE ENGLISH CERTIFICATE OF BANKRUPTCY IN BAR, IN A FOREIGN
JURISDICTION, TO THE SUIT OF A FOREIGN CREDITOR, AS CONFIRMED IN APPEAL, WITH THE
AUTHORITIES, AND FOREIGN AND ENGLISH CASES-To which is Prefixed A Treatise on the
Difference between Personal and Real Statutes, and its Effect on Foreign Judgments
and Contracts, Marriages and Will. With an Appendix, on the Present Law of France
Respecting Foreigners. (London, 1823).
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d'Observations."' 7 It was the first presentation in a treatise in the
English language of the conflicts theory of the statutists. The book
and the Odwin opinion had not been known in the United States at
the time of Ogden v. Saunders.""
After publication of the work, Henry received another public appointment. He was made Senior Commissioner of Inquiry into the
Administration of Justice in the British West Indies and South American Colonies. At the time of the visit of Wheaton to London, Henry
had returned from his inspection trip and was engaged in writing his
report 0 and completing a translation of Van der Linden's Institutes
of the Laws of Holland. 0
The information on Henry is supplied, primarily, to furnish background for some of the questions asked of Wheaton by Henry. Of
the circumstances under which these questions were submitted nothing is known. On the other hand, we know of the place and date of
the answering. Wheaton kept a diary during his mission to Denmark.
The diary2 l is among the "Papers of Henry Wheaton" at the John
Hay Library of Brown University. An entry under "November 10,
1827" reads: "Sent to London my amended Answers to Mr. Henry's
questions on American law. Wrote Mr. Bentham." This seems to
suggest that a set of answers had been given earlier, possibly, while
Wheaton was still in London. In any event, what appeared in the
January 1828 issue of "The Jurist" is no doubt the "amended Answers."
17 "Boullenois distributed all statutes into three classes. . . . Mr. Henry, in his

Dissertation on Personal, Real, and Mixed Statutes, has adopted the like distribution,
without any acknowledgment of the source, (Boullenois,) from which he has drawn
all his materials. See Henry on Personal and Real Statutes, ch. 1, § 2 to ch. 3, § 1,
2-33." STORY, CommENTAtiES ON TiE CONFLiCT or LAWS, 13, note 6 (1834). While proper
source references are lacking, references are made to Boullenois in the Dissertation
e. g., at p. 60: "Boullenois illustrates this by the following example. . . ."; p. 83:
"However, as Boullenois observes ... "; p. 84: "Upon this article Boullenois puts

the case of a Frenchman...."
18 See note 11, supra. The first reference to Henry's treatise in this country seems
to be in the second edition of Kent's Commentaries. See 2 KENT, COinIENTARIs ON
Ai E CAN LAW 455 note (c) (2d ed. 1832). For a reference in a well known case, see
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 211, 212 (1895).
19 See First, Second, and Third Report (Second Series), of the Commissioners
of Inquiry into the Administration of Criminal and Civil Justice in the West Indies
and South American Colonies (London, 1827, 1828, 1829).
20 VAN DER LINDEN, INSTITUTES or ThE LAWS OF HOLLAND .(Henry trans. London,
1828).
21 "Mission to Denmark 1825 to 1827," Wheaton Papers, John Hay Library,
Brown University, Providence, R. I.
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As a postscript it may be noted that Wheaton and Henry had
further contacts. The diary has an entry, under October 3, 1828:
"Sent Mr. Henry M.S. of American Constitutional Law for publication." The present writer has not been able to find a publication of
this sort. The "Jurist" having suspended publication at the beginning of 1829, placement of the manuscript may not have been possible.
In 1831, Wheaton went to London on a visit. Through his article in "The Jurist," if not otherwise, he had become known in England as an authoritative expounder of American law. During his
stay he was invited by the- Commissioners appointed to inquire into
the Practice and Proceedings of the Superior Courts of the Common
Law, to answer questions concerning American law on the subject of
"Arrest for Debt." The answers, dated May 21, 1831, and which are
well worth reading, are printed in the appendix to the Fourth Report
of the Commissioners.

22

The diary discloses that, while in London, Wheaton obtained
from Henry a legal opinion on the copyright question involved in
Wheaton's argument with Richard Peters over Peters' publication of
the "Condensed Reports" of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. 23 Wheaton v. Peters,24 decided by the Supreme Court

against Wheaton, will be recalled.
Wheaton's later years were absorbed by his interest in Public
International Law which led to the production in 1836, while he
served as Charg6 d'Affaires in Berlin, of his classic: "Elements of
International Law." The Elements contain a short chapter on Conflict of Laws. In it the reader can find use made by Wheaton at one
place of materials in "Henry on Foreign Law. ' 25 Henry had died in
London in 1835.
The following is a reprint of Wheaton's statements on American
Law as they appeared in the January, 1828 issue of "The Jurist."
22 Fourth Report Made to His Majesty by the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Practice and Proceedings of the Superior Courts of Common Law, Appendix, 1A to 3A (1832).
23 "Diary," June 24, 1831: "Wrote Paine about Copy-Right and enclosed Serj't
Stephen and Mr. Henry's opinion."
24 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U.S. 1834); see note 10, supra at 124.
25 Wheaton refers to a Grotius opinion given in 1613, reproduced in the Appendix of Henry's Foreign Law, on the application of the rule of mobilia sequuntur
personain to succession. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 83, note (a)
(Dana Edition of Wilson ed., 1936).
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AMERICAN LAW
IN a former number (a) we endeavoured to give a general outline
of the state of the law among our Transatlantic brethren; we are at
present enabled to furnish our readers with some of those details that
possess the greatest interest for foreigners. These we publish in their
most authoritative shape, as Queries and Answers,--the Queries proposed by the senior Commissioner(b) of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in the British West Indies,--and the Answers given
by a distinguished member(c) of the bar at New York, one of the
Commissioners appointed to revise the Statute Laws of that State.
The answers to Queries 14 and 15, upon the degree of influence possessed by the English Common Law and precedents in the different
States of the Union, upon the progress made in the study of jurisprudence, and upon the legal reforms in contemplation in the State of
New York; and the whole of the answers under the head of "Slaves,"
are peculiarly entitled to attention. The points involved in some recent decisions of Lord Stowell are slightly touched upon under the
latter head.
BANKRUPTS

Question 1. Would a discharge duly obtained by a foreign
debtor in his own domicile protect him from a suit here by an American creditor who had notice of the commission, and time to prove
under it, the debt being supposed to be contracted in the bankrupt's
domicile?
Answer. I think the general tendency of our judicial decisions
(though not without exceptions) has been to give effect to a discharge
fairly obtained in the country where the debt was contracted, even
against our own citizens, creditors of the bankrupt. But some of our
state courts have restricted the operation of such discharges to the
citizens of, or persons domiciled in, that particular state where the
discharge was obtained, and the supreme court of the United States
early determined the principle, that our courts could not take notice
of the title of foreign assignees, against the claims of creditors resident and attaching in the United States, nor against the priority of
the government as to its debtors.-(Cranch'sReports, Vol. v. p. 289,
Harrisonv. Sterry.) So that although foreign assignees are permitted
to sue in the United States, ex comitate, yet their title to the bankrupt's effects is not allowed to prevail against the claims of his creditors, citizens of that country. And it may be considered as doubtful,
since the judgment of the supreme court in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, (Wheaton's Rep. Vol. xii. p. 213,) whether a foreign discharge
can be pleaded in the United States in bar of a suit for a debt,
wherever contracted, unless as against a creditor subject to the juris(a) No. I. p. 22. (b) Mr. Henry. from the United States to the Court (c)
Wheaton, now minister of Denmark.

Mr.
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diction of the country where the discharge was obtained: i.e. whether
a British subject (for example) could plead his certificate of bankruptcy obtained in England against an American, or other creditor,
not a British subject, and not domiciled in England.
Q. 2. Would a bankrhpt fleeing from his commission in England be allowed to sue his debtor in the courts here, after his legal
disability had taken place by operation of law in England?
A. Although the title of assignees under a foreign commission
of bankruptcy will not be permitted to interfere with an attachment
by one of our citizens (his creditor) of debts due to the bankrupt
in the United States, yet if the bankrupt himself should attempt to
collect those debts, the right of his assignees would (as I conceive)
be preferred in our courts. It follows, I think, as an inevitable corollary from the assignees' right to sue in any case, that their title must
always be preferred to that of the bankrupt, as I suppose it would
always be to that of his creditors, subjects of and domiciled in the
country where the discharge was obtained.
Q. 3. In case of bankruptcy or insolvency on the part of an
American trader, can the local creditors in any state obtain a preference over the foreign creditors, by any local process of attachment,
or otherwise?
A. In several of the states, the creditors, whether resident, or
represented by their agents, may gain a preference over others, by a
prior attachment, in the nature of a foreign attachment, under the
custom of London, or otherwise. In others of the states, the attachment is made by one or more, for the benefit of all the creditors.
Q. 4. Do you conceive that the notice given to foreign creditors,
before an American debtor obtains his discharge in his own state,
sufficient for all the purposes of justice, and are there any complaints
of the term of the notice under an English commission in this respect?
A. Not having the statutes of the different states of the Union
before me, I am not able to answer this question with the requisite
precision, so far as respects the American laws; but the notice to
foreign creditors under the British statute, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, for amending the bankrupt laws, is certainly too short for the purposes of
justice.
Q. 5. Supposing an American trader to commit an act of bankruptcy in one state, and to possess effects in several states of the
Union, which place would be the locus concursus creditorum, or
which would have jurisdiction as to the general distribution and discharge in this case, and would the circumstance of the act of bankruptcy being committed out of the regular fixed or ordinary domicile of the trader make any, and what difference?
Q. 6. Supposing the trader to have several firms in the several
states, how would the respective creditors be ranked in such case?
A. to Qs. 5 and 6. We have,. at present, no general bankrupt
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code, and the laws of the particular states do not proceed in invitum
upon the notion of an act of bankruptcy committed by the insolvent
debtor, but upon his own voluntary application, or the joint application of himself and his creditors. In the case put in query, No. 5,
if any contest should arise as to the insolvent's effects in different
states, under the various attachment laws, it would be determined
upon the general principles of international law, and not by any rule
peculiar to the jurisprudence of America.
Q. 7. Do you experience any difficulties from want of a general and uniform code of bankrupt laws for the several states of the
Union?
A. Many inconveniences are certainly experienced for want of
uniform laws of bankruptcy throughout the union. But though Congress is empowered to make such laws, much difficulty has occurred
in endeavouring to form a system suited to the various wants, habits,
and institutions of twenty-four different states. These difficulties have
been a good deal magnified by the opponents of the measure, who
have fortified themselves by arguments drawn (among other sources)
from the real or supposed abuses in the administration of the British
bankrupt laws as developed in the reports to the House of Commons,
and other discussions which have recently taken place in England.
Q. 8. Can two or more concurrent commissions exist against
the same party in respect of his property in different states?
A. The eighth query seems to be already answered. The form
of proceeding under the state insolvent laws is not by a commission
of bankruptcy or sequestration: and any conflict of jurisdiction which
might arise under the discordant provisions of the attachment laws
of different states, would be determined upon the general principles
of universal law applicable to such questions between different nations.
Q. 9. Has the state, as sovereign, any lien or privilege on the
property of its debtor or accountant, in the case of insolvency or default, similar to that of extents in England?
A. Each state of the Union and the government of the United
States have by law a right of priority or preference in payment
over private creditors on all property of their debtors. If there be a
conflict between the privilege of the United States and that of a particular state, the claim of the latter must yield to the former. The
sureties of such debtors are privileged in the same manner; and all
assignees, whether under the bankrupt laws, or composition deeds, as
well as executors and administrators, are bound to pay all debts due
to the United States before they pay any private debts.
Q. 10. Do you conceive that a general bankrupt code for commercial Europe, and America and the colonies, recognizing in common merely, and giving effect to certain general and fixed principles,
leaving the detail and localities of the proceedings to each particular
state, would, if practicable, be beneficial?
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A. Such an international bankrupt code would doubtless be
beneficial; but I should think the difficulties in establishing it by general consent would be found almost insuperable.
Q. 11. Is bankruptcy considered in the United States as savouring of crime according to the old commercial law of Europe, or how
otherwise?
A. Bankruptcy is not, generally speaking, considered as savouring of crime; but the bankrupt law of the United States, enacted in
1800 (now no longer in force), punished certain offences against its
provisions criminally. Any attempt, however, to punish offences
against the policy of the bankrupt laws capitally, would not be
endured in America.
In this connection it may be useful to mention that if the doctrine of the supreme court in Ogden and Saunders (Wheaton's Rep.
Vol. xii. p. 213.), should ultimately be established as a part of our
settled jurisprudence, foreign creditors (who have the privilege of
suing in the federal tribunals) will encounter no obstacle in the local
state insolvent laws to the recovery of their debts, a discharge under
those laws not being considered as a bar to a suit in the Courts of
the Union.
FOREIGN DECREES AND APPOINTMENTS

Q. 12. How far does the appointment by a foreign judge of
guardians, receivers, curators, or committees of persons or property
take effect in the United States?
Q. 13. Supposing a foreign judge to appoint a curator to a
prodigal, or committee to a lunatic, and the party to come to the
United States with his curator or committee, could the judge of his
actual domicile here in such case relieve him from this legal incapacity
under the foreign appointment, on proper application and investigation as to his disability to manage his affairs having ceased?
A. to Qs. 12 and 13. I am inclined to think that a very limited.
effect, if any, would be allowed in the United States to such appointments: and, in general, it may be safely answered that no greater
effect would be allowed to them than by the law of England.
Q. 14. Do you consider the English precedents and decisions,
either in law or equity, as having any, and what force in the American courts?
A. It would not be easy, within the compass of reasonable limits,
to give a full and satisfactory answer to this question. In general, it
may be stated that the law of England, in its broadest sense, including the system of common law and equity, is the foundation of our
jurisprudence. Except such parts of the common and statute law as
never were applicable to our local circumstances and condition, or
such as have become inconsistent with the nature of our government
since the Revolution, it is every where regarded as the rule in cases
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not provided for by our own positive institutions. But in some of the
states, the reports of English adjudications subsequent to the Revolution are expressly forbidden from being read as authority in the
courts. In others, as in New York, the decisions of the English courts
since the declaration of independence, 1776, are not considered as of
binding authority: and the entire system of common law and equity,
as applicable to this country, has been greatly modified by local statutes and by the adjudications of our own courts, which now form a
great body of jurisprudence peculiar to the United States, although
it has been formed with a general reference to the analogies of English law.
The State of Louisiana forms an exception to what has been said.
The original basis of the law of that province was the Roman civil
law, modified by the French and Spanish codes, introduced by its
successive masters. Since its acquisition by the United States, the
institutions of trial by jury and the habeas corpus have been extended
to that part of the Union. All criminal cases are tried by jury, but
in civil cases issues of fact are tried by jury at the option of either
of the parties who may insist upon that mode of trial. The civil code
of the country has been recently revised, and Mr. Livingston is now
engaged in preparing a penal code, and a code of prison discipline.
The system of equity as administered in the High Court of
Chancery of England, has been adopted in New York and several
other states, so far as is applicable to our local situation and circumstances. But the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in bankruptcy,
lunacy, minority, and over charities, is not exercised (as a matter of
course) by our Chancellor; and in cases where this peculiar jurisdiction is exercised, it is vested in him by special statutes with certain
modifications applicable to our condition. In some of the states, the
general system of equity has been partially received, and with very
great modifications. In those states where it has not been introduced,
the courts of law have found it necessary to adopt and act upon the
doctrines of equity in the determination of legal rights, to a far greater
extent than in England. But the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Union (which have cognizance of suits by aliens and between citizens
of different states,) extends to all cases in equity as well as at law;
and the practice is modelled upon that of the High Court of Chancery
in England. It should be observed, however, that our Chancery practice has been very much simplified; the expences of an equity suit
are much less than in England; and the delays are not greater, if
they are so great, as in an action at law. An account of the practice
will be found in Mr. Johnson's Chancery Reports, and in a work published by Mr. Hoffman upon the practice of the Court of Chancery
of New York.
In the supreme court of the United States, and in the supreme
tribunals of several of the states, a regular series of reports is pub-
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lished by official reporters, who receive annual salaries from the government as an encouragement to their labours, and the decisions have
also been collected in Digests or Indexes, for the purpose of ready
reference. Various elementary treatises and compilations upon different branches of the law have also been published, and these different
works have already swelled to a sufficient number, to form a considerable library. The number of reports amounts to 250 volumes, and
at least fifteen volumes are added to these every year. Nearly all the
English common law and equity reports, and many of the elementary
treatises published in England, are republished in America, with annotations by our own lawyers.
Our professional men have also recently turned their attention
to the study of the Roman civil law, and its maxims and principles
are familiarly resorted to for the purpose of illustrating and expanding the doctrines of the common law, thus adapting them to the wants
of a, more civilized and commercial age. In several of our universities
and colleges, professorships of the municipal law and of general jurisprudence are established, and a faculty of law is attached to the university at Cambridge, where the resident graduates, and other students who resort to the school receive instruction both in the common
and civil law. A law academy has been established at Philadelphia,
where instruction is communicated in courses of lectures and exercises. There are also several private law-schools in different parts of
the country, where courses of studies, preparatory to admission to
the bar, are carried on under the superintendance of eminent judges
and barristers, some of whom are retired from practice, and others are
engaged in it. Of the private law-schools, that of Judge Gould at
Litchfield, in Connecticut, of Chancellor Kent at New York, and of
Mr. Hoffman at Baltimore, are the most distinguished. Extensive
courses of lectures are given by these gentlemen, accompanied with
oral instruction, and illustrated by exercises in most courts and debating societies. The stludents have the use of the valuable libraries
belonging to the professors, whilst in the great towns they have also
the advantage of a regular attendance on the courts.
The interpretation of our written constitutions of government
has given rise to a great number and variety of questions of judicial
cognizance, the decision of which has already formed a body of constitutional law peculiar to America. The adjudications respecting it
will be found scattered throughout the Books of Reports and collected in several elementary works, compilations, and abridgments.
Among them are Chancellor Kent's Lectures, and Mr. Serjeant's book
entitled "Points of Constitutional Law." "The Letters of Publius,"
or the Federalist,comprise a series of papers written by Mr. Madison, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Jay, and published at the time of the
adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1788. This work is justly regarded as of great authority on questions of contemporaneous con-
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struction, and is used in several of our universities as a text book of
instruction in the science of government. The question, how far the
common law of England ought to be considered as applicable to the
United States at large, considered as a federal government, and to be
adopted as a rule for cases arising in the tribunals of the Union,
where no written law has been provided by Congress, or where the
application of the written law requires the aid of suppletory rules,
has been much discussed both at the bar and by elementary writers.
A very clear statement of the different views which have been taken
of this subject will be found in a treatise published by Mr. Duponceau, of Philadelphia, on the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States.
Q. 15. Is the common law of England considered as the common law of each state of the Union co-extensively, or does it differ
in degree, and by what rule is it determined that it is of force in any
particular state or case?
A. The common law has been adopted in the different states in
various degrees, according to the successive epochs of their colonization, or the spirit and genius of their original legislators. Whether
the common law be applicable in any particular case, is determined
in each state by the statutes thereof, ancient usage, or the decisions
of the courts. In most of the states the leading provisions of the
statute of Wills, Hen. VIII.; of Limitations, of James I.; the statutes of Frauds, of Elizabeth and Charles II.; and the Habeas Corpus
Act of 31 Charles II.; have been adopted, with the whole body of
English decisions interpretive of their text. In some of the states, the
older British statutes modifying the common law have been expressly
adopted: in others they have been repealed, and their most important
provisions re-enacted. In all, a great mass of local statute legislation
has accumulated, and efforts are now making to clear it from the confusion occasioned by the successive additions which have been made
to it since the earliest colonial times, without much regard to method,
and frequently for the mere purpose of providing for some temporary
evil or inconvenience.
The practicability and usefulness of reducing the whole body of
the common and statute law, including the system of equity, to a
written text, has been recently much discussed in America. The great
variety of the sources of our jurisprudence, its complexity constantly
increasing with the multiplication of new laws, and new adjudications
upon the old immenso aliarum super alias acervatarum legum cumulo
-the inherent uncertainty of all unwritten law depending on conflicting precedents and analogies-have forcibly impressed the public
mind with the desireableness of such a work. But the difficulty of
accomplishing it, and of preserving it from being overrun (as all
other codes have hitherto been) by a new wilderness of glosses and
interpretations, has not been disguised or underrated by those who

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

['VOL. 4

distrust the consequences of so extensive an innovation. The nearest
approach which has yet been made to such an attempt in any of our
states, whose jurisprudence is derived from the common law of England, is the revision which is now being made of the statute laws of
New York. By an act of the legislature, passed in April, 1825, commissioners were appointed to revise and consolidate the statutes of
that state upon a plan approaching to that of a code. By the provisions of the act, the commissioners were authorized to revise all the
written laws of the state; to consolidate all acts and parts of acts
relating to the same subjects; to distribute them methodically under
proper titles and divisions; to suggest the best mode of reconciling
apparent contradictions, supplying defects, and amending what required alteration; to designate what ought to be repealed, as mischievous or useless, and recommend the passing of such new acts as
might be expedient or necessary to complete the system; and, finally,
to complete the revision in all other respects in such a manner as they
might deem best adapted to render the laws more plain and easy to
be understood. Under the authority thus given to them, the commissioners have made a classification of the laws to be revised under the
following general divisions: 1. Those which relate to the territory,
civil polity, and internal administration of the state. 2. Those which
relate to private rights, or what is commonly included in a civil code.
3. The judiciary establishment and civil procedure. 4. Crimes and
punishments. 5. Local laws and municipal incorporations. These were
again subdivided into chapters, titles, articles, and sections, according to a scientific arrangement of the matters included in these different sub-divisions. No enacting clause is proposed to be introduced
except at the head of each of the five general divisions, where it is
to be preceded by a short preamble, setting forth the expediency of
consolidating, arranging, simplifying, and amending the statutes relating to the subjects included in that division. In drawing up the
text, the great object in view was to free it from inconvenient verbosity; to distribute it into short sections, each containing a single
proposition; to avoid, as far as possible, all ambiguities of expression;
and by simplifying the language, to render it more clear, precise, and
intelligible. In exercising the power given to them of suggesting alterations and amendments, the commissioners have proposed draughts
of the revised statutes, as they would appear after the contradictions,
omissions, or imperfections in the existing laws should have been
remedied, and after the parts proposed to be repealed should have
been omitted; on the supposition that the expediency of such alterations would best be explained and understood by an actual exhibition of the text, as it would stand after the proposed changes had been
made, and in connexion with those provisions of the present laws
which are intended to be retained. What has been said refers to the
phraseology, style, and arrangement of the proposed new digest of
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statute laws. But it will be necessary to refer to the printed reports
of the commissioners, and drafts of bills annexed, to form an adequate notion of the extent and importance of the substantive alterations proposed by them. These are most considerable in the first division of the work, which relates to the territory, the political divisions, the civil polity, and the internal administration of the state.
The plan of the revisors was most easily adapted to this portion of
the statutes, it having grown out of our peculiar institutions and local
condition, and having little reference to the common law either in its
origin, or as furnishing the rule of interpretation.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND CONTRACTS

Q. 16. In suits upon these, would the American courts feel
themselves at liberty to go into the merits, or merely receive the judgment as evidence of the debt?
A. A foreign judgment, when brought directly in question between the same parties, has the same conclusive effect as by the law
of England. The judgments and decrees of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction have also, in general, the same effect, when brought
collaterally in question (Cranch's Rep. Vol. iv. p. 434.) Crondson v.
Leonard. (Wheaton's Rep. Vol iii. p. 246. Hoyt v. Gelston.) So also
the judgments of foreign courts of Prize, and other tribunals proceeding in rem, are received as conclusive of the title of property in
the thing; but the question, how far a sentence of condemnation in a
foreign court of admiralty should be considered as falsifying the warranty of neutrality, contained in a policy of insurance, has been much
discussed in our courts. The supreme court of the United States
adopts the English rule on the subject (Cranch's Rep. Vol. iv. p. 436.
Crondson v. Leonard.). The courts of New York have rejected it;
and the legislature of Pennsylvania has expressly provided against it
by statute.
Q. 17. When foreign law is quoted in the courts here in support or avoidance of a foreign contract or obligation, how far do the
judges consider themselves bound to notice it, or give it effect?
A. The rule of evidence as to foreign laws is precisely the same
as in England. They are to be proved as facts: written laws, by the
evidence appropriate to the proof of foreign public documents, and
laws which have not been reduced to a written text, by the testimony
of persons skilled in the laws of the foreign country.
ABSENTEES.

Q. 18. In suits against persons out of the jurisdiction, what is
the mode of proceeding with respect to notice, or otherwise, and can
a suit be brought against a transient person after he has left the
country by any fiction of law as to notice, so as to affect his property
here instead of suing him in his own fixed domicile?
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A. Most of the states of the Union have attachment laws, by
which proceedings may be commenced against absent persons having
all the effects of a suit. Different periods and forms of notice are provided, to enable the party to come in and dissolve the attachment
by giving bail to the suit. In general, the attachment is for the exclusive benefit of the creditor who makes it; but by the law of New York
it is for the benefit of all the creditors, trustees being appointed who
take possession of the absent debtor's effects for distribution among
all his creditors, pro rata, unless he returns within a year and discharges his debts.
A voluntary assignment made by the debtor for the benefit of a
particular creditor, or class of creditors, will operate a transfer of his
property wherever situate in the Union; and if prior in date, and duly
notified, will overreach an attachment made under the laws of the
state where the property lies

WILLs.
Q. 19. Does a will executed abroad according to the forms of
the place where it is dated, carry personal property here; and in case
of intestacy abroad, would the law of the place where the party happened to die, or be last domiciled, prevail as to the mode of distributing his personal property?
A. A last will and testament executed abroad, according to the
law of the place where it is made, will carry personal property in
the United States; but it must receive probate there in the proper
court having jurisdiction of testamentary matters, before it can be
made the foundation of a suit for a legacy; and this even where by
the foreign law the will requires no probate. (Wheaton's Report,
Vol. xii. p. 169, Armstrong v. Lear). The executor named in the foreign will cannot act in the United States, until authorised by an appointment as administrator with the will annexed. Foreign letters of
administration are not regarded.
The law of the place where the party happens to die, or to be
last domiciled, prevails as the mode of distributing his personal property.
POWERS.
Q. 20. Are powers or deeds duly executed abroad, according to
the forms of the place, valid here, or are there any special regulations on this head in the laws of registry of the several states of the
Union?
A. Powers or deeds relating to personal rights or personal property, duly executed abroad according to the forms of the place, are
valid in the United States. But powers or deeds relating to real property in the United States must be executed according to the laws of
that state where the property lies. These are various in their details,
but in general the deed must be acknowledged before some judge or
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magistrate, before it can be admitted to registry. The laws of some
of the states provide for an acknowledgment before the Lord Mayor
of London, or Minister of the United States residing in London, or
Lord Provost of Edinburgh, in the case of persons executing deeds in
Great Britain. Such is the law of New York.
Q. 21. Is it necessary that the power by an absentee or foreigner to execute or acknowledge the deed or instrument here, be inserted within and made part of the deed itself; or may it be by a
separate instrument?
A. It is not necessary that the power should be inserted in, or
annexed to the deed; but a power to execute a deed must be under
seal, according to the well known technical rule of the law of England.
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES.

Q. 22. Would a marriage in Scotland, or any other country,
where it has the effect of legitimating the children born before such
marriage, have that effect here, should the parties afterwards come
to reside in these states?
A. I am inclined to answer this query in the affirmative, on
general principles; but I am not aware of any judicial decision in
America bearing directly on the question.
Q. 23. Could the courts in this country dissolve a marriage legally contracted in another, and, vice versd, would the courts of this
country notice a divorce obtained abroad of a marriage duly celebrated here between two of their own citizens?
A. The courts of the United States are in the habit of dissolving marriages contracted in foreign countries; but in some of the
states a residence of considerable length is required to constitute
a domicile for the purpose of suing for a divorce. Our courts would,
as I conceive, notice and give effect to a divorce, obtained abroad,
of a marriage duly celebrated in the United States, between our own
citizens, or others, upon the same principles and with the same restrictions as respect the conclusiveness of other foreign sentences.
MINORS.

Q. 24. Would a native of Holland, who is not of age before
twenty-five, be held liable for contracts entered into by him here
without the authority of his guardian under that age, and would there
be any difference in this case with respect to the bona or mala fides
of the transaction on either side?
A. The answer to this query must depend on general principles
of international law. The question would, as I conceive, be determined in Washington precisely as at Westminster.
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SLAVES.

Q. 25. Would the circumstance of a slave coming as a domestic servant with his master to one of the non-slave-holding states here
render him thereby free, ipso facto, and without process, or what
would be its effect?
Q. 26. Supposing an American citizen of a slave-holding-state
to take a slave with him to England or to one of the non-slave holding states of the Union as a domestic, would the party by voluntarily
returning with his master to his domicile resort to his original state of
slavery, or what would be the effect? and what would be the consequence of the slave's fleeing to a free state from a slave-holding-state?
Would the former be bound to restore him on application?
As. to Qs. 25 and 26. If a person removing into a state where
slavery is prohibited, animo manendi, carry his slave with him, the
slave becomes free so long as he remains in that state. But a voluntary return of the negro with his master to his original domicile in
the slave-holding-state, would probably be there considered as reviving his former condition.
The constitution and laws of the Union secure to the owners of
slaves in the slave-holding-states, when they abscond into the other
states, the privilege of reclaiming them by judicial process. The same
privilege extends to the case of a slave-owner travelling with his domestics into the other states animo redeundi.
Q. 27. In questions respecting freedom in the slave-holdingstates, is the Roman law of manumission, or the English law of villenage, followed in judicial proceedings thereon, or what other mode
of proceeding, and in interpreting the law do the judges follow the
principle of favendum est libertati?
Can a slave by any act or mode of proceeding be manumitted
out of his owner's domicile?
A. The rule of partus sequitur ventrem is adopted: and I believe
the analogies of the English law of villenage, rather than the Roman
law, are followed on this subject. But I speak with the less confidence
because I am not familiar with the practice in the slave-holding-states.
The mode of proceeding is by what is called a Petition of Freedom,
and the trial is by jury under the direction of the court as to the law.
There is no reason to doubt the impartiality of our courts and juries
on questions of this sort.
Q. 28. Does the circumstance of colour operate as a presumption against liberty in a slave-holding-state?
A. The circumstance of colour does, I believe, operate in the
slave-holding-states, as a presumption against liberty, but it is a presumption which readily yields to contrary proof.
Q. 29. Is the evidence of negroes and persons of colour, admissible in your courts of justice under any and what restrictions?
A. In the non-slave-holding states, the evidence of persons of
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colour is admissible. In the slave-holding-states, it is, I believe, universally rejected as against white persons.
Q. 30. Is this evidence, when admissible, found to be in general worthy of credit, and in what degree?
A. This query will be answered under No. 32.
Q. 31. Do the courts of the several states in such cases lean to
admit the competency of the party, and to throw the objections upon
credibility, or how otherwise?
A. Our courts, in all cases, lean against objections to the competency, leaving them to have their proper weight as to credibility.
But, in general, the English law of evidence is adopted in our practice.
Q. 32. Is the evidence of negroes, and persons of colour in general, entitled to less weight than that of white persons of the same
condition in life, and if so, do you attribute such difference to an inferiority of capacity or integrity?
A. My experience on this subject is confined to the non-slaveholding-states. I think the evidence of persons of colour is entitled
to neither more nor less weight than that of other persons in the same
condition of life; but it must be admitted that the social and moral
condition of the free people of colour is in a very low state. A large
proportion of the persons convicted of crimes are of that class, and
though efforts have not been wanting on the part of the benevolent
to give them the advantages of education and religious instruction,
they still remain a degraded caste, with the indelible marks of a distinct race impressed upon them, which as it prevents the complete
union of the two races, must ever present a barrier to their being
raised to an equality in the social state with the whites. The emancipation of the slave in ancient Europe, and of the feudal villein in the
middle ages, required but a single effort to place them on a level with
their former masters. But in America, physical distinctions and irresistible feelings of antipathy founded upon them, are more powerful
than the laws which pronounce them free and entitled to an equality
of civil privileges. It is for this reason that the efforts of humane individuals, and of the government, have been directed to the removal
of the race back to the continent from which they were originally
transported. But there are formidable obstacles to this scheme of
colonization, and it remains yet to be seen whether they can be surmounted. Whatever may be the result of this attempt, the people
of the United States do not merit the reproach of having done nothing to efface the stain of slavery and its consequences, entailed upon
them by the improvidence of their ancestors, and the commercial policy of the mother country. The colonial assemblies, at a very early
period, passed bills for prohibiting the further importation of Africans, which were negatived by the crown. After the establishment of
the present federal government, Congress passed laws forbidding our

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL. 4

citizens from engaging in the foreign slave trade, which were very
soon followed by a total prohibition of the importation of slaves into
every part of the union. Indeed, Denmark is the only power which
can claim the honour of having preceded us in the abolition of this
traffic. The constitution of our national government has left the question of emancipation entirely to the local legislatures of the several
states, nor has it been overlooked by them, since slavery is already
abolished in a majority of the states where it formerly existed under
the colonial government. In the extreme southern and southwestern
states, the subject is embarrassed with the same difficulties as in your
own West Indian colonies, and you are too well acquainted with the
nature of these, not to appreciate their magnitude.
MISCELLANEOUS.

Q. 33. Are Masters in Chancery in this country restricted from
acting as solicitors or counsellors, and obliged to take their references
in rotation?
A. Masters in Chancery are, in general, prohibited from practising as solicitors.
Q. 34. Do you consider the entire abolition of fees in judicial
offices as salutary, or with some restrictions?
A. I think a fixed salary, paid by the government, is the most
proper mode of compensating judges. But where the fees can be so
regulated as not by possibility to influence the conduct of the judge,
it may, under certain circumstances, be found the most convenient
mode of compensating judicial officers. The judges of our superior
courts, both of the states and of the Union, are compensated by fixed
salaries. But Masters in Chancery, Commissioners of Insolvents, and
the class of judges who are authorized to make such interlocutory
orders, as are usually made by a judge at chambers in England, are
compensated for their services by fees paid by the parties. This is
also the case with Commissioners, Notaries, Sheriffs, and other ministerial officers connected with the administration of justice. The
judges of the courts having jurisdiction in testamentary matters, and
of intestates' estates, are compensated in the same mode.
Q. 35. Are the usury laws, or laws limiting the rate of interest, considered as salutary or beneficial in the United States?
A. The policy of the usury laws is exploded with us, so far as
respects enlightened opinion. But the laws are still in force in most of
the states of the Union, and every attempt to repeal or modify them
is encountered by strong opposition.
Q. 36. Has the tread-mill been generally adopted as a mode of
punishment in the states, and has it been found efficacious?
A. The tread-mill has been adopted in some of the states, but I
am not enabled to speak with accuracy as to the general results of
our experience on the subject.
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Q. 37. How far has the penitentiary system been adopted, and
found to answer?
A. The penitentiary system has been adopted in most of the
states, and I think the general result of our experience respecting it
is far from being so discouraging as some have represented. I believe
that in the instances where the anticipations of its friends have not
been fulfilled to the utmost, it has been owing to errors in the construction and practical administration of the prisons; or from too
sanguine expectations of what can be accomplished by human legislation, and which of course must always be attended with disappointment. Some information as to the defects in the construction and
management of the present prisons, and the measures proposed to be
taken to correct them, will be found in the "First Report of the Prison
Discipline Society, Boston," published in 1826; in a report of the
commissioners appointed by the legislature of New York, to visit the
state prisons, January '15, 1825; and in a pamphlet, published in
1826, by Mr. G. Powers, entitled "A brief Account of the New York
State Prison, at Auburn." Mr. Livingston has also prepared a code
of prison discipline for the state of Louisiana.
Q. 29. Do you conceive the English system of punishment by
arithmetical proportion, as by making grand and petty larceny differ
only in the degree of value, or that of geometrical proportion, which
estimates crime by a moral scale, better adapted for the purposes of
distributive justice?
A. I think the distinction between grand and petty larceny is
not adapted to promote the ends of justice, and that it ought to be
taken away. I am very glad to find that this has been done by Mr.
Peel's bill, at the late session of parliament.
Q. 39. Is the crime of forgery of frequent occurrence in the
United States, and do you consider the punishment of death as the
most efficacious to check it?
A. The crime of forgery and other offences against the rights of
property, are not so frequent in America as in England. But the
great multiplication of paper currency in the United States has been
attended with a correspondent increase of the crime of forgery. It is
never punished with death; but the query, whether that punishment
would be found more efficacious than those now inflicted involves the
general question, so much discussed among the writers on penal legislation, as to the punishment of death.
Q. 40. Do you consider it an advantage to have distinct courts
of equity, instead of leaving to the common law judges the power of
an equitable consideration in certain cases, not provided for by the
common law?
A. I do not consider it an advantage per se, to separate the
courts of equity from those of law. But where the division of the
two tribunals has existed for a long time, and a distinct system of
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equity has ripened into a code, and become a rule of property,
greater inconveniences than advantages would probably follow from
investing the courts of law with equity jurisdiction. This question
was much considered in the convention of New York, in 1821, and
the result of the discussion was to continue the Court of Chancery
upon its ancient footing, giving to the circuit courts a concurrent
jurisdiction, subject to an appeal to the Chancery, in order to preserve the uniformity of the system. But this regulation has not much,
if at all, diminished the business of the Court of Chancery, the most
important suits being still brought there originally, and the increased
population, wealth, and trade of the state occasioning a proportionate
increase of litigation.

